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Abstract  
 
The satellite network does not have the IP layer where the IPsec [2][3] is designed for. 
Therefore, a new algorithm is needed to secure the satellite link at link layer or physical layer. 
This paper will give a short analysis on the advantages and disadvantages of the MPEG-2 TS 
encryption and present an approach trying to use the extension header of Unidirectional 
Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) [6] Protocol Data Unit (PDU) to provide the efficient security 
solution for satellite networks. This approach is just above the MPEG-2 TS layer and makes the 
link security as a part of the encapsulation layer. 
Thanks to a test bed platform named PLATINE developed by France partners and contributed by 
other partners within the SATSIX project on which the DVB-S and DVB-RCS have been 
implemented. The Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) [6] mechanism working 
together with MPEG 2 Transport Stream (TS) as a part of the encapsulation in PLATINE is for 
the transport of IPv6 (& IPv4) Datagrams and other network protocol packets directly over the 
ISO MPEG-2 Transport Stream as TS Private Data. The proposed security approach is 
implemented within PLATINE to provide integrated security with ULE protocol at the link layer. 
The approach is based on the security requirements Internet draft [1]  
 
Introduction 
Current broadband satellite services are regarded as a niche market due to the high cost of 
launching a satellite system, and the relatively limited available bandwidth compared to 
terrestrial counterparts. To improve take-up of broadband satellite, it is essential to provide cost-
effective solutions, to efficiently accommodate new multimedia applications, and to integrate 
satellites into next generation networks.  These issues are being addressed in the EU-funded IST 
FP6 project Satellite-based communications systems within IPv6 (SATSIX). This project will 
implement innovative concepts and for broadband satellite systems and services. 
The MPEG-2 Transport Stream (TS) has been widely accepted not only for providing digital TV 
services, but also as a subnetwork technology for building IP networks. RFC 4326 [6] describes 
the Unidirectional Lightweight Encapsulation (ULE) mechanism for the transport of IPv6 (& 
IPv4) Datagrams and other network protocol packets directly over the ISO MPEG-2 Transport 
Stream as TS Private Data.  ULE specifies a base encapsulation format and supports an extension 
format that allows it to carry additional header information to assist in network/Receiver 
processing.  
The encapsulation satisfies the design and architectural requirement for a lightweight 
encapsulation defined in RFC 4259 [7] , which states that ULE must be robust to errors and 
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security threats. It recommends that any new encapsulation defined by the IETF should allow 
Transport Stream encryption and should also support optional link-level authentication of the 
SNDU payload. In ULE, it is suggested that this may be provided in a flexible way using 
Extension Headers. This requires the definition of a mandatory header extension, but has the 
advantage that it decouples specification of the security functions from the encapsulation 
functions. Moreover the use of extension headers for securing the ULE link can also be used for 
security of Generic Stream encapsulation (GSE) [8]  to be used for DVB-S2 systems.  
The rest of the paper is organized as following: The section 2 will give a brief discussion on 
security requirements on MPEG 2 satellite network and the ULE security extension header 
proposed by [1] The PLATINE satellite network testbed platform is explained in section 3 as 
well as the implementation of the ULE security approach. The thorough validation test is shown 
in section 4 with results. 
 
The Secure ULE Approach 
MPEG-2 based networks are susceptible to several security attacks, both passive and active. 
Therefore some mandatory (or optional) security services should be provided such as: 
• Data Confidentiality (Mandatory): Data confidentiality is achieved by encrypting the 
higher layer PDU (and other ULE extensions headers that may be present and require 
security) before encapsulation in the ULE SNDU. 
• Receiver NPA address hiding (optional): This is an important objective for ULE security 
to prevent any passive attacks like traffic analysis. 
• Source authentication (Optional): Message Authentication Code (MAC) is generated for 
each message to enable receivers to carry out the source authentication 
• Data Integrity (Optional): the MAC is also needed for receivers to check the integrity of 
each packet. 
• Replay Attacks Countermeasures (Optional): A traditional way to protect services from 
replay attacks is to use sequence number in the appropriate packet header. 
With these security requirements in mind, a security algorithm is proposed in [1] which is trying 
to use the ULE extension header to provide link security focusing only on the security between 
the ULE source and receivers. It is to eliminate the need to consider security issues regarding the 
remaining system components, such as multiplexers, re-multiplexers and modulators. 
The security extension aims to secure the transmission of user traffic over MPEG-2 Transport 
Streams.  In order to address the security issues, Figure 1 shows the SNDU format with the 
security extension header.  
This security extension is a standard extension header as described in Section 5 of [6] and does 
not affect the ULE base protocol. This security extension header is a Mandatory ULE Extension 
header. This means that a receiver MUST process this header before it processes the next 
extension header or the encapsulated PDU, otherwise the entire SNDU should be discarded. 
There are four new header fields are added in the ULE extension header, which are: 
• Security ULE Type Field: A 16-bit Type Field indicates that this is a Secure ULE SNDU. 
• ULE-SID Field: A 32-bit security identifier, the ULE-SID similar to the SPI used in 
IPsec has been added to uniquely identify the secure session. This ULE-SID represents 
the security association between the MPEG-2 transmitter and receiver for a particular 
session and indicates the keys and algorithms used for encrypting the data payload and 
calculating the MAC. The ULE-SID is used by a receiver to filter PDUs in combination 
with the NPA address when present.  
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• Sequence Number Field: An optional 32-bit sequence number MAY be included in the 
ULE SNDU to prevent replay attacks. The gateway monotonically increments this 
number when it sends a packet to the receiver and the receiver verifies the correct 
sequence number and MUST discard all SNDUs which do not match. If an adversary 
tries to inject or replay old packets the sequence number would not match. This would 
result in discarding the packet.  
• Message Authentication Code (MAC) Field: To provide both data origin authentication 
and data integrity, a Message Authentication Code (MAC) is included in the extension 
header.  
 
Figure 1 ULE Format with Security Extension Header 
Secure ULE does not impose the use of any specific encryption algorithm and should be able to 
support the commonly used algorithms including DES, 3DES etc. 
When a receiver received a Secure ULE SNDU, it first filters the received packets according to 
the receiver destination NPA address (if present). Then The CRC is verified as defined in [6]. 
The Receiver uses the ULE-SID to obtain the security associations between the transmitter and 
receiver and determines if the sequence number and the MAC are present or not. This is also 
used to determine the algorithms and keys used for both encryption of the encapsulated PDU and 
for generation of the message authentication code. 
 
The Implementation of Secure ULE over PLATINE 
To implement the proposed secure ULE extension header approach above, the satellite testbed 
was setup using a satellite emulator called PLATINE developed by partners within SATSIX.  
The PLATINE is based on Linux operation system, in which most of the DVB-S and DVB-RCS 
satellite network functions have been implemented. These functions include network topology 
configuration, Quality of Service (QoS), Demand Assigned Multiple Access (DAMA), traffic 
encapsulation using both Asynchronous Transfer mode (ATM) and ULE/MPEG, satellite 
network entities configuration and support for both IPv4 and IPv6. 
PLATINE satellite emulator runs on top of a network testbed. It has a centralized development 
component, a single PC, called Satellite Emulator (SE), which also performs the DVB satellite 
payload functions. The emulator software is installed in this SE and all development work, i.e. 
programming, is done on it. It has a management user interface, through which the satellite 
gateway (GW) and terminal (ST) functions can be distributed to the correspondent entities, i.e. 
PCs or laptops.  
The Figure 2 shows the PLATINE testbed constructed in our lab using both desktops and 
laptops. It has 1 laptop as SE, 2 desktop as STs and 1 other desktop as GW, which are connected 
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by a hub to form a local network. 2 extra hubs connect each ST with a desktop as end user, 
which form two other local networks. 
 
Figure 2: PLATINE testbed layout with secure ULE 
The proposed ULE security approach has been partially implemented in the PLATINE satellite 
testbed described above. All the compulsory ULE security extension header fields, i.e. the D 
field, the length field, the type field and the SID field, have been implemented as well as payload 
encryption and decryption functions.  
The implementation work has been carried out on the SE within the encapsulation functions. The 
PLATINE has its own ULE encapsulation classes that are needed in the ULE security 
implementation. Beside these classes, there is another class specifically written for ULE 
extension headers in PLATINE named UleExt, which has been directly inherited to build the 
security extension header class called UleExtSecurity. It has two main functions named 
UleExtSecurity::build( ) and UleExtSecurity::decode( ). 
The UleExtSecurity::build( ) function executes the IP packet encapsulation. In another word, it 
adds the security extension header fields to the PDU in this case. Besides, it will read the key 
corresponding to the ULE_SID from the key storage file and encrypt the PDU. 
The UleExtSecurity::decode( ) function perform the decryption functions. It reads the ULE_SID 
when a ULE PDU is received and obtains the corresponding key from its local key storage file to 
decrypt the PDU. Figure 3 shows the flow chart of both UleExtSecurity::build( ) and 
UleExtSecurity::decode( ) functions. 
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a) UleExtSecurity::build( )  b) UleExtSecurity::decode ( ) 
Figure 3 ULE security approach flow chart 
 
ULE Security Validation 
The implementation has been validated in a testbed scenario shown in Figure 2 to test if the ULE 
security can work along with all other DVB-S functions implemented on the PLATINE testbed. 
We used both PING application, FTP application and VideoLAN (VLC) application to test the 
behavior of the ULE security function. The detail procedure and results are shown as following: 
1. To Patch PLATINE to enable the security functions. 
2. To configure the SE, STs and GW to use ULE protocol instead of ATM. 
3. To set up the testbed with two end users, workstation 1 and workstation 2, sitting behind 
different STs as shown in Figure 2. 
4. Distribute the correct encryption and decryption keys to all STs and run PING from 
workstation 1 and workstation 2. 
5. Change the decryption key on ST3 and run the PING from workstation 1 and workstation 
2. 
6. Correct the decryption key and change the encryption key on ST1 and run the PING from 
User B to User A. 
7. Distribute the correct encryption and decryption keys to all STs and start a FTP server on 
workstation 1. 
8. Start a FTP client on workstation 2 and login to the FTP server on workstation 1. Do file 
listing and download a file from the server. Logout after finishing. 
9. Change the decryption key on ST3 and repeat step 8. 
10. Distribute the correct encryption and decryption keys to all STs and start a VLC server on 
workstation 1 and streaming a multimedia file to workstation 2. 
11. Start a VLC client on workstation 2 to listen to the streaming. 
12. Change the decryption key on ST3. 
The results from the PING application test showed that workstation 1 can successfully ping 
workstation 2 with a RTT around 610ms over the PLATINE testbed when all STs had the right 
encryption key and decryption key as shown in Figure 4. The PLATINE    Figure 5 
shows the IGMP messages were processed on ST1.  However, when the encryption key did not 
match the decryption key, either the ping messages or the acknowledge messages were dropped 
because of failure decryption. 
Generate the ULE_SID 
Get the following PDU 
type 
Append the ULE_SID and 
PDU type field after the 
ULE header  
Read the key  
Generate corresponding 
RC4 stream cipher   
PDU encryption   
Append the PDU to the 
ULE header   
Return 
Read the ULE_SID 
Obtain the corresponding 
key 
Generate corresponding 
RC4 stream cipher   
Obtain PDU and do 
decryption   
Append the plain PDU to 
the ULE security 
extension header   
Return 
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Figure 4 Ping results over secured PLATINE    Figure 5 Example of Ping messages processed on ST 
 
Then there is another question needed to be asked that what’s the RTT if without security? In 
another word, how much does the security function impact the system’s performance? To find 
out, the security function was disabled and the above procedure was repeated. The Ping results 
Figure 6 comparing to Figure 4 showed the security function does not have significant impact to 
the system performance at all in terms of the RTT, especially considering long satellite delay. 
 
Figure 6 Examples of Ping messages without ULE security 
 
The FTP test provided further validation proves on the ULE security function. After a successful 
connection between receiver and the FTP server, a file is transferred using "get" command. In the 
middle of the transfer, the decryption key was modified on ST3 which resulted failure of 
receiving data from the FTP server immediately. However, the client was keeping on trying to 
re-establish the connection. After 30 seconds, the decryption key was reversed back and the 
transfer resumed until the client accomplished the file transfer. The traffic flow diagram Figure 7 
shows the data was transferring at a speed of 40Kbps in the beginning of the file downloading 
with a typical TCP slow start. And then the transfer was interrupted due to the wrong key 
deployed. However, the FTP application managed to keep the connection alive during this 
period. When the key is correctly deployed, the connection was resumed and the rest of the file 
was correctly downloaded. Similarly, the multimedia streaming test using VLC showed that the 
secure ULE works well with the right keys had been deployed on both STs. The workstation 2 
can not play anything when ST3 did not have the right key but the streaming continued on the 
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server side. Then the workstation 2 started to play the streamed file immediately after the right 
key is restored at ST3.  
 
Figure 7 File downloading over secured Platine 
 
Figure 8 shows the one ULE SNDU is segmented by MPEG protocol into three MPEG TS 
frames during the file downloading. 
 
Figure 8 ULE Security header layout 
Figure 8 shows clearly both the MPEG TS header and the ULE header with security extension in 
the first MPEG frame.  The highlighted 10 bytes are the 4 bytes ULE header and 6 bytes security 
extension header.  As the Destination Address Absent (D) Field is set to 1, the Destination 
Address Field is omitted in this case [6].The ULE length field 0x0221 gives the payload length 
of 545 including the CRC, which matches the first line in Figure 8 giving the ULE payload 
length of 541 excluding the 4 bytes CRC. After the ULE length field is the 16 bits long Next-
Header Type Fields. Its first 8 bits gives the length of the extension header 3*2 = 6 bytes 
according to [6]. And its second 8 bits gives the type of the next header that is the security 
extension. The following 32 bits of the security extension header is the ULE-SID Field which is 
given as 0x115C or 4444 in decimal. Following is the next-header type field that is 0x0800 for 
IPv4. 
The impact of the security function on the FTP service performance was also examined. Figure 9 
a) is the file downloading result on PLATINE without ULE security and b) is the result with 
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ULE security. The downloading time was 65 seconds, the same for both cases. The transfer 
average speed of case a) is even faster than case b), which is on the contras of theory that 
encryption and decryption of each frame should increase the processing time. This shows that the 
variability of the testbed itself has even higher impact on the experiment than the security 
function does. Therefore, the impact of the security function to the testbed can be neglected. 
 
            
      a) with ULE security       b) without ULE security 
Figure 9 FTP file downloading service a) without ULE security and b) with ULE security 
 
Conclusions  
This document has a brief discussion on the requirements for ULE security provides an approach 
using the ULE security extension headers based on the ULE standard extension header definition 
without affecting the ULE base protocol. 
A satellite network testbed has been setup where the proposed approach has been partially 
implemented under the umbrella of a software DVB satellite emulator called PLATINE. The 
implementation extended the encapsulation functions of PLATINE to support the ULE security 
extension headers and en/decryption of the PDU. 
ULE security implementation has been validated within SATSIX project using different 
applications and the results showed that the approach can works well on the PLATINE testbed as 
well as providing confidentiality and access protection to services provided over the satellite 
network testbed. Moreover, the security function has neglected impact to the testbed 
performance in terms of RRT and throughput. 
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